I am a final-year Ph.D. Candidate in Engineering-Economic Systems at the CS and AI Laboratory and the College of Computing, MIT. I study how the design of Economic institutions that try to learn what participants want is affected by large-scale estimation. My supervisors Alessandro Bonatti, Dylan Hadfield-Menell, Eric Maskin and David Parkes guide me through this adventure. In fall 2024, I will join Stanford’s Institute for Human-Centered AI as a postdoctoral fellow.

📧 • CV • Linkedin • Github • G Scholar • ORCID

Professional Experiences. Federal Trade Commission • European Commission • Bundestag • MITx • Professional School Gross-Gerau.

Recent Leadership. Science Policy Initiative • MIT AI Ethics&Policy • GSC Sustainability.

Co-Organized Events. Technical Questions on the EU AI Act • Algorithmic Audits in Economic Contexts • Wastewater Surveillance • Data Externalities.

---

Writing. Risk Aversion of Learning Algorithms (Conditional Accept at GEB) • Contextual Privacy (ACM EC ‘22) • Towards Psychologically Plausible Dynamic Preference Models (ACM RecSys ‘22) • Optimal Equilibria via Zero-Sum Games (Neurips ‘23) • Certification Design for a Competitive Market (ACM EC ‘24) • Recommending to Strategic Users (FORC ‘23) • Formal Contracting for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (ACM SIGAI AAMAS ‘23, R&R at JAAMAS) • Auctions for Federated Learning (ICLR ‘21 DPFL) • Understanding Single- and Multi-Homing on Transportation Platforms (TR: C) • Our Class Can’t Happen (letter) • Opaque Mechanisms • Comment for Data Access Delegated Act of the European Union Digital Services Act: Experimental Data • Steering No-Regret Learners (ACM EC ‘24) • The Economics of Social Network Interoperability (memo) • Convex Markov Games.

Theses. B.Sc. Mathematics • M.Sc. Mathematics • M.Sc. Economics • B.Sc. Computer Science.

Work in Progress. Optimal Preferencing Design • RegretBlocker • Game-Theoretic Network Decay • On Generation and Search.

Coverage. MIT.